By Hamza Faisal
Researchers at Lumen's Black Lotus Labs have exposed what they call Silent Train, a covert relay network used by the China-linked hacking group Volt Typhoon to hide zero-day attacks against US government agencies, defence contractors and critical infrastructure. The report, published on October 28 after three years of tracking, links the network to four confirmed zero-day campaigns and a fifth suspected one, and says hundreds of victim organisations have been notified along the way.
Silent Train is not a single piece of malware. It is an operational framework: a constantly changing chain of compromised small-office routers, internet-connected devices and enterprise systems that carries the attackers' traffic to its target while hiding where it came from. Because the chains are disposable, Lumen says, taking down any one of them barely slows the operation down.
A relay that rebuilds itself in minutes
Each session typically began on a rented server outside the United States, then passed through compromised routers and connected devices abroad before reaching a compromised device inside the US, close to the target. That final hop made the traffic look local, helping it slip past location-based blocks and reputation filters. Chains averaged about four devices before reaching a US address, and some ran as many as six hops.
Sessions lasted about four hours on average, and the operators wiped their tools and traces from the relay devices when they finished. Individual chains were assembled and dismantled daily, and Lumen says Volt Typhoon demonstrated a repeatable ability to rebuild a chain with fresh infrastructure in under two minutes. The network used at least 27 device classes.
Four zero-days, one target type
Every confirmed campaign through Silent Train targeted a centralised management platform, the kind of system that already holds trusted access across a large network. The four confirmed zero-days were in Versa Director (CVE-2024-39717), where attackers deployed a web shell dubbed VersaMem; N-able N-central (CVE-2025-8875 and CVE-2025-8876); Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN (CVE-2026-20127); and Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator (CVE-2026-16812), an unauthenticated command-injection flaw rated the maximum 10.0 severity score and added to the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's exploited-vulnerabilities catalogue in July 2026.
A separate campaign against Quest KACE is suspected to be a fifth zero-day, affecting more than 30 victims, though Lumen's assessment there is moderate confidence rather than confirmed. Victims included telecom providers, government bodies, defence contractors, universities, managed service providers and operators in water, energy, transport, maritime, rail, aviation and emergency services. California, Texas and Hawaii were the most targeted states, a pattern Lumen says fits pre-positioning for a crisis in the Indo-Pacific region.
Why defenders say blocklists will not work
Lumen's central warning is that the network's design defeats the usual response. Because relay addresses change constantly and sessions leave little behind, IP blocklists and single-point monitoring will miss most of it, and the researchers caution that their observations should not be read as a complete census of Volt Typhoon activity. Instead, they advise organisations to restrict internet exposure of management interfaces, patch management platforms quickly, centralise and retain logs for longer, and review trusted connections that bridge partner or customer networks.
The attribution itself carries a caveat worth keeping in view: Silent Train is attributed to Volt Typhoon by Black Lotus Labs, and US officials have long described Volt Typhoon as a China-linked group focused on US critical infrastructure. The report does not claim that every notified organisation suffered the same depth of compromise, so operators running the named platforms should check the vendor advisory and confirm the fix is applied.



