By Hamza Faisal

Security researchers have uncovered a rentable Android spyware platform that hides inside repackaged Telegram, WeChat and GCash apps, stealing passwords, messages and wallet sessions while victims use what looks like the real app. Tracked as uCreater and sold as YingGai, it was exposed after researchers found its source code on an unprotected server, revealing a multi-year operation rented to multiple operators.

Researcher Ovi, who published the findings on October 26, found it does not use fake login screens. It runs code inside the legitimate app, reaching data after decryption. Victims install a modified app via sideloading or social engineering, or a container app called Onion Box, after which further modules download from Alibaba Cloud OSS and MinIO buckets.

Inside the real app, not a fake login screen

For Telegram, the kit uses LSPatch, which merges hooks into a repackaged app without root access, and loads a file called TgJarPine.dex. Operators can then query the live message database, read chats and collect contacts. Most seriously, the module captures the two-step verification password in cleartext before hashing, and can reset sessions, change a linked phone number, delete an account, or hide the attacker's session from the victim's list.

WeChat runs inside a VirtualApp container instead, with the module extracting login identity information for account cloning. Researchers found no evidence the examined sample read WeChat's encrypted database, and stress the code shows capabilities, not proof every action was used. The platform is said to support about 20 apps, including WeCom, WhatsApp, LINE, Zalo and MoMo, and can spoof camera feeds and intercept one-time passwords.

A rented platform with a paper trail

The probe also exposed the business behind it. An exposed GitLab server held 13 repositories from roughly three dozen developers on China time, describing Spring Cloud services for command dispatch and data collection, plus a console stamping each task with a merchant ID. Commands move over Redis, Kafka and RocketMQ, scheduled to dodge security controls.

Artifacts link parts of the operation to three Changsha companies in Hunan province: Hunan Youchuang Technology, tied to the ucreater.com brand; Changsha Sukai Network, holder of the control server domain filing; and Changsha Zhuoqing E-commerce, named on a code-signing certificate. A Hunan police-technology institute domain shared the same gateway fingerprint, but researchers say shared cloud infrastructure proves co-tenancy only, not ownership. Ovi assesses it as financially motivated crimeware, an assessment, not a proven fact.

The victim count is unknown. Ovi found stolen data on a control server and five samples that contacted it, with artifacts from China and the United States across about 48 hosts, but neither customer nor device numbers are established. Some domains were dead by October 23, and the hooking engine failed on Android 17 in Pixel 10 Pro tests, obstacles that may slow operators if they do not update their tools.

How to spot it and stay safe

Protection starts with official app stores only: treat any modified app, download link or multi-account container from elsewhere as hostile, and regularly review Telegram and WeChat sessions, revoking anything unfamiliar. Defenders can hunt for TgJarPine.dex and an original APK under cache/lspatch/origin/, and verify signing certificates against vendor keys. Until the scope is known, any sideloaded messenger should be treated as compromised.