By Hamza Faisal
An attacker spent nearly two weeks inside the cloud accounts of multiple Qubole customers, stealing stored secrets and copying data — without ever touching a customer's own credentials to get in. Cloud security firm Wiz disclosed the campaign on November 9, saying the intruder rode in on credentials belonging to Qubole's own Amazon Web Services account, then used the trusted access customers had granted the data platform to move through their environments.
Qubole, a data lake platform owned by Idera, works inside its customers' AWS accounts. When a customer connects the platform, it creates a cross-account IAM role whose trust policy allows Qubole's AWS account to assume it, with each request carrying a matching code known as an External ID. According to Wiz, the attacker obtained credentials for the AWS account Qubole's platform uses — account 805246085872 — and submitted AssumeRole requests that carried valid External IDs. Every one of them was accepted.
The activity ran from October 14 to October 26. How the attacker obtained Qubole's credentials has not been disclosed, and Wiz did not say whether the credentials have since been disabled or whether the intrusion has stopped. Neither Qubole nor Idera had published a statement about the incident when The Hacker News checked on November 9.
What the attacker took
Once inside, the intruder harvested credentials wherever the assumed roles could reach them: environment variables from Lambda functions, secrets stored in AWS Secrets Manager, and values in Systems Manager Parameter Store. The attacker ran the stolen credentials through TruffleHog, an open-source tool that tests whether leaked secrets are still live — and the haul included the victims' own AWS access keys, Entra ID client secrets, and Okta client credentials.
The attacker also copied data out of S3, the cloud storage service. Wiz said the theft looked opportunistic rather than targeted: the intruder read from whatever buckets each role could reach, sometimes downloading an entire bucket in a single session. CloudTrail logs record role assumptions and bucket listings, but not which objects were read, so victims may never know exactly what left their accounts.
Most of the roles the attacker assumed were dormant, belonging to organisations that had stopped using Qubole — but nobody had removed them, so the trust relationship was still live and waiting to be abused.
A second, earlier intrusion
Wiz also reported a separate round of activity from October 8 to October 11, in which an attacker used customers' own AWS access keys that researchers believe had been set up for Qubole integrations. That earlier activity compromised a small number of cloud environments. Wiz has not linked either campaign to any publicly reported activity, and says the targeting does not match the patterns usually associated with state-backed groups.
What customers should do now
Wiz is urging every organisation that has ever connected Qubole to AWS — even one that no longer uses it — to review its CloudTrail logs from October 1 onward. The telltale sign is an AssumeRole request from account 805246085872 coming from an address outside AWS. Affected organisations should rotate every credential a compromised role could have reached, revoke active sessions, and delete unused Qubole roles outright. Vendor trust policies, Wiz adds, should be tightened to restrict access by source IP address or VPC endpoint.
The incident is a reminder that third-party access does not expire on its own. A vendor integration switched off months ago can still hold the keys to a cloud account — and, as Qubole's customers have learned, an attacker only needs the vendor's credentials to walk straight through the front door.



