By Hamza Faisal
Kaspersky researchers have identified a new UEFI bootkit, dubbed BlackX, that was used in an espionage campaign in early 2026 against diplomatic agencies in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The researchers attribute the campaign with medium confidence to APT41, a China-linked threat group also known as Brass Typhoon and Wicked Panda.
BlackX is a firmware-level implant: it tampers with a computer's boot process before Windows fully loads, giving attackers deep, persistent access that survives operating-system reinstalls and evades most endpoint security tools. What makes the case striking is that the machines it hit were patched — yet still vulnerable.
Patched machines, open door
BlackX exploits a known Secure Boot bypass called Baton Drop, tracked as CVE-2022-21894. Microsoft patched the flaw, but the fix is not complete on its own: administrators must manually add the "Windows Production PCA 2011" certificate to the Secure Boot forbidden list, known as the DBX, to block the vulnerable binaries.
Many organizations never completed that step. The certificate expired on October 19, 2026, but vulnerable components keep loading on systems where it was never blocklisted. Kaspersky says the diplomatic targets it examined had Windows updates installed — patched, but not protected — and that the attackers exploited exactly this gap.
A ghost of BlackLotus
BlackX closely resembles BlackLotus, a notorious UEFI bootkit that circulated on underground forums from late 2022 and was confirmed by ESET in March 2023. Kaspersky describes BlackX's implementation of the Baton Drop exploit as "remarkably similar" to BlackLotus, though it stops short of proving a shared author.
One clue points to a skilled operator: BlackLotus source code leaked in July 2023, but the leak was incomplete, and BlackX contains code that was absent from the public repository. Kaspersky believes the operator either reverse-engineered BlackLotus or bought its source code. BlackX is not an entry tool, the researchers stress — attackers first gain administrator rights on a network, then deploy the bootkit to stay.
Once installed, BlackX drops a malicious kernel driver that tampers with security callbacks and event tracing, and hides its own files. Its follow-on payloads include a remote access tool that uses Google Drive, OneDrive and Yandex.Disk for command and control, and a second payload that launches a Rust-based implant.
Why the fix takes manual work
Kaspersky's advice is blunt: check whether the Secure Boot revocation has actually been applied, test the change on representative machines, and prepare recovery media before rolling it out. The BlackX campaign is a reminder that a patch applied is not always a patch completed — and that the gap between the two is exactly where sophisticated espionage groups now operate.
— Hamza Faisal



