Canonical has patched a maximum-severity authentication flaw in LXD and MicroCloud that let an attacker impersonate a trusted client without ever holding that client's private key. Tracked as CVE-2026-112816, the vulnerability carries a CVSS score of 10.0, the highest possible rating, and affects all supported versions of both products.

LXD is Canonical's system container and virtual machine manager. MicroCloud ties several LXD machines together into a small cluster. Both products authenticate remote clients over mutual TLS, a setup in which the client presents a certificate to prove its identity before it can manage containers, virtual machines, and storage.

The flaw, disclosed by Canonical on October 30 and detailed publicly on November 1, sat in how the server checked those certificates. It is a textbook case of a small validation gap with outsized consequences: a public certificate, which is not a secret, was enough to pass as someone else.

How the impersonation works

But a TLS connection only proves ownership of the private key for the first certificate in the chain, known as the leaf. LXD's server, however, compared every certificate the client sent against its trust store, including extra certificates attached further down the chain.

That mismatch opened the door. An attacker who could reach the LXD or MicroCloud HTTPS API over the network, and who held a trusted client's public certificate, could attach that certificate to their own TLS chain and be treated as that client. Public certificates are not secret material, so obtaining one is a far lower bar than stealing a private key.

Once impersonating a trusted client, the attacker inherited whatever permissions that identity carried. Canonical's advisory warns that if the impersonated client had privileged access, the attacker could gain root on the host machine, because an unrestricted LXD client is effectively root on the hypervisor. MicroCloud clusters carry an extra weak point: an attacker who captures a member's public certificate as it joins the cluster can then log in as that member.

Which versions are affected, and what to install

The affected releases are LXD 4.0.14, 5.0.10, 5.21.8, and 6.9, each up to the fixed release that follows it, along with MicroCloud 2 and 3 before their fixed snaps. Canonical has released fixed snap versions for every supported line: LXD 6.10.1, 5.21.9, 5.0.11, and 4.0.15, and MicroCloud 3.4.1 and 2.1.5. Administrators on snap installs can apply them with sudo snap refresh lxd and sudo snap refresh microcloud.

Canonical noted the fixed LXD point releases were still rolling out from candidate to stable, so verify the installed version after refreshing. Ubuntu's own archive packages of LXD are listed as not affected or not shipped, so the snap releases are the ones that matter.

The bug did not start at Canonical. The Incus project, which began as a community fork of LXD, reported the flaw and confirmed it affected LXD as well. Incus fixed the same issue in version 7.6.0.

No known exploitation, but patching is urgent

There is no public sign the flaw has been used in an attack. A United States CISA assessment dated October 30 states the vulnerability is not known to have been exploited, it is not on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list, and no working exploit has been published.

That clean record should not breed complacency: the prerequisites are modest — network access to the API and a public certificate — and any deployment with a network listener was exposed.

For operators, the advice is straightforward: update to the fixed releases now, verify the installed version, and restrict network access to the LXD API to trusted hosts where possible.

By Hamza Faisal